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Supporting Europe’s new phase of  
re-industrialisation
En este artículo se aborda el papel fundamental que desempeñan las actividades de fabricación en la 
economía europea y las dificultades a las que Europa se enfrenta para mantener una fuerte base in-
dustrial. Desde hace ya varios años dicho papel está siendo objeto de un interés renovado y ha vuel-
to a ocupar los primeros puestos de la agenda política. Existen varias razones para ello. La primera 
es que la crisis sacó a la luz la vulnerabilidad de la industria europea con respecto a las tendencias 
actuales de aceleración y apertura de mercados. La segunda es que la crisis puso de manifiesto im-
portantes desequilibrios económicos; en particular, los riesgos asociados a una elevada dependencia 
del sector financiero y de servicios. Con este telón de fondo, los responsables de formular políticas 
de la UE han comenzado a reconsiderar el papel de las actividades de fabricación y a reconocer 
como una cuestión preocupante el declive de la producción europea. En paralelo a esta forma de 
pensar, una nueva retórica se ha difundido por toda Europa. Por ejemplo, La Comisión Europea ha 
resaltado el papel central de las actividades de fabricación para apuntalar la recuperación del creci-
miento y los puestos de trabajo, así como para acometer los retos planteados por la sociedad. Para 
poder hacer frente a dichos retos, este artículo propone tres opciones estratégicas: (1) la promoción 
de nuevos modelos de negocio; (2) la creación de ecosistemas industriales a través de la innovación 
sistémica; y (3) el apoyo a una auténtica cadena de valor europea que, en su conjunto, podría esti-
mular una nueva fase de reindustrialización en Europa.
Artikulu honetan bi gai jorratzen dira: ekoizpen-jarduerek Europako ekonomian jokatzen duten 
oinarrizko rola, batetik, eta Europak oinarri industrial indartsu bati eusteko dituen zailtasunak, 
bestetik. Urte batzuk dira rol horrek berriz ere interesa pizten duela eta agenda politikoaren 
lehentasunetako bat bilakatu dela. Hainbat arrazoik azaltzen dute hori. Alde batetik, krisiak agerian 
utzi zuenez, Europako industria ahula da gaur egun nagusitzen ari diren azeleratzeko eta merkatuak 
irekitzeko joeren aurrean. Gainera, krisiak desoreka ekonomiko handiak azaleratu zituen; bereziki, 
finantza- eta zerbitzu-sektoreekiko gehiegizko mendekotasunaren arriskuak. Egoera horretan, EBko 
politikak ezartzeko arduradunak ekoizpen-jardueren rola birplanteatzen hasi dira, eta Europako 
ekoizpenaren gainbehera kezkagarritzat jotzen hasi dira. Pentsaera berri horiekin batera, erretorika 
berri bat zabaldu da Europa guztian. Esate baterako, Europako Batzordeak zera nabarmendu du: 
ekoizpen-jarduerek ezinbesteko rola jokatu behar dutela hazkundea eta lanpostuen sorrera finkatzeko 
eta gizarteak planteatzen dituen erronkei heltzeko. Erronka horiei aurre egiteko, hiru aukera 
estrategiko proposatzen dira artikulu honetan: (1) negozio-eredu berriak sustatzea; (2) ekosistema 
industrialak sortzea sistemaren berrikuntzaren bitartez; eta (3) Europan balore-kate erreal bat 
bultzatzea, bere osotasunean Europaren berrindustrializazio-fase berriaren pizgarri izan litekeena.
This paper addresses the pivotal role that manufacturing activities play in the European economy and 
the difficulty that Europe faces to maintain a strong industrial base. That role has been subject to a 
resurgence of interest for already a number years and has resurfaced at the top of the policy agenda. 
There are several reasons for this. First, the crisis brought out the vulnerability of the European 
industry into the open and accelerated on-going trends. Second, the crisis highlighted some major 
economic imbalances. In particular, the risks associated with a high reliance on the financial and 
service sectors. Against this backdrop, EU policy makers have started to re-consider the role of 
manufacturing activities and to recognise the decline of manufacturing production in Europe as a 
matter of concern. Along this line, a new rhetoric has spread all over Europe. For instance, the 
European Commission has highlighted the key role of manufacturing to underpin the recovery of 
growth and jobs and to address societal challenges. In order to cope with such challenges, this paper 
proposes three strategic choices: (1) the promotion of new business models; (2) the creation of 
industrial eco-systems through systemic innovation; and (3) the support for a genuine European 
value chain, which together could stimulate a new phase of re-industrialisation in Europe. 
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1. IntrODUCtIOn
The role that manufacturing activities are playing in European economies has 
been subject to a resurgence of interest for already some years and has resurfaced at 
the top of the policy agenda  in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis of 
2008-2009. There are several reasons for this. First, the crisis brought out European 
industry’s vulnerability into the open and accelerated on-going trends, including the 
intensity of global competition and the inadequacy of several policies decided both 
at the European and national level. Second, the crisis shed light on some major eco-
nomic imbalances. In particular, it highlighted the risks associated with a high reli-
ance on the financial and service sectors, the steady decline of manufacturing activi-
ties in our economy as well as the urgent need to look for new sources of growth. 
Such observations were rapidly confirmed by the fact that the economic recovery 
proved more difficult in countries with a weak industrial base.
In this context, policy makers, including EU leaders, have started to re-consider the 
role of manufacturing activities in our advanced economies and to recognise the de-
cline of manufacturing production in Europe as a matter of concern. Deindustrialisa-
tion is no longer perceived as a natural process of economic development. The mere fo-
cus on the service sector that was, until recently, seen as the way to go in many EU 
countries, has appeared as not being a sustainable choice in the long run. Along this 
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line, a new rhetoric has spread all over Europe, with the European Commission playing 
a central role in this. Several communications have been published in which the Euro-
pean Commission repeatedly affirmed the importance of a strong industrial base. For 
instance, the Commission highlighted in the 2010 Communication on an ‘Integrated 
Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era’1 the key role of manufacturing in underpin-
ning the recovery of growth and jobs and addressing societal challenges such as climate 
change and ageing population. A list of priority actions was set, including horizontal 
measures in the different areas affecting European industry’s competitiveness. The im-
portance of a coordinated approach in EU policies, as well as the need for increased co-
operation between Member States, was stressed. In its 2012 Communication entitled ‘A 
stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’2, the Commission called 
for a partnership between the EU, its Member States and industry at large, and decided 
to complement its horizontal approach with a more vertical one, giving emphasis on 
specific technologies. It announced intentions to focus investment and innovation on 
six priority action lines: advanced manufacturing technologies for clean production, 
key enabling technologies, bio-based products, sustainable industrial policy, construc-
tion and raw materials, clean vehicles and vessels, and smart grids. Finally, the Com-
mission reiterated its message in its 2014 Communication ‘For a European Industrial 
Renaissance’3, which called on Member States to mainstream the support to industrial 
competitiveness in all policy areas and to raise the contribution of industry to GDP to 
as much as 20% by 20204. With the new college of Commissioners starting its mandate 
at the end of 2014, the 20% target became less of a priority and the rhetoric on re-in-
dustrialising Europe slightly changed in nature. In line with initial statements, the new 
Commission decided to put more emphasis on improving and simplifying already ex-
isting EU laws instead of creating new legislation5. In addition, policy advocates have 
questioned whether the content of manufacturing activities is not more relevant than 
its exact volume. Thus, greater importance (at least in the public discourse) has been 
put on smart and clean industries as a way to create a comparative advantage vis-à-vis 
other regions of the world.  
1  European Commission (2014), «An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era - Putting 
Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage», COM (2014) 614.
2  European Commission (2012), «A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery», 
COM (2012)582 final.
3  European Commission (2014), «For a European industrial renaissance», COM (2014)14/2.
4  Today’s manufacturing contribution to GDP accounts for about 15%. It is worth noting that other 
countries do also have similar targets. In China, the GDP share of the industries considered as strategic 
is targeted to rise by 15 percentage points by 2020. In India, the share of manufacturing value added in 
GDP is targeted to raise from 16% to 25% by 2022. See Manyika J., Sinclair J., Dobbs R. et al. (2012), 
«Manufacturing the future: the next era of global growth and Innovation», McKinsey Global Institute.
5  See: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/industrial-policy-europe/eus-revamped-industrial-poli-
cy-dogged-better-regulation-dispute 
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All this shows that there is growing awareness on the role that manufacturing 
sectors play in our economy and the need to maintain a strong and diversified in-
dustrial base. However, many inconsistencies arise across Europe, and EU industrial 
policy is still far from being a fully fledged and integrated strategy. The new global 
environment, be it increased global competition with traditional and new competi-
tors, growing global demand for resources and high volatility of commodity prices, 
changing consumption patterns, and the spread of technological innovations for 
manufacturing, will require structural changes and new strategic choices on behalf 
of stakeholders in manufacturing activities. Europe will have to make a number of 
clear decisions in the face of global competition and concentrate its efforts on ac-
tions, which can boost its competitiveness in the long run. 
This paper6 aims to contribute to the current policy debate, by identifying the 
kind of choices that will have to be made in the current context. To start with, chap-
ter two depicts some recent developments in the role and evolution of industry across 
Europe and highlights the main elements of concerns for Europe’s future competi-
tiveness. Chapter three takes a forward looking approach and presents a series of poli-
cy options focusing on three main areas for action to revamp industry in Europe and 
to make it better equipped to deal with today’s global challenges. The paper is finished 
by a section with conclusions (chapter four).
2. EUrOpEAn InDUStrIES In thE FACE OF gLObAL ChALLEngES
Facts and figures leave no room for ambiguity: manufacturing is facing major 
challenges in Europe and the sector is losing ground in our economies. This chapter 
shows, through empirical evidence, the gradual decline of manufacturing and puts it 
into perspective by comparing EU manufacturing trends with the ones occurring in 
other economies. Current developments raise major concerns for Europe’s future 
competitiveness. In addition, it is shown that significant divergences exist between 
Member States with regard to the performance of the manufacturing sector and its 
weight in the economy. Such divergences clearly highlight the important role that 
public policies play in providing the manufacturing industry with the right tools for 
its development.
2.1. the gradual deindustrialisation process in Europe
The decline of manufacturing in Europe is nothing new and all studies 
providing evidence on this issue convey the same message: Europe has been going 
through a process of deindustrialisation for several decades, and this process was 
6  For a longer version of this paper, see: Dhéret C., Morosi M. with Frontini A., Hedberg A., and Pardo 
R. (2014), «Towards a New Industrial Policy for Europe», EPC Issue Paper n°78. 
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accelerated some years ago as a result of the financial and economic crisis. 
Manufacturing in Europe has been facing serious difficulties for a long time, which 
can be illustrated by the constant reduction of the manufacturing share in almost all 
macro-economic indicators.
Figure 1 displays the tremendous effect that the crisis has had on manufacturing 
activities and the slow recovery that has occurred since then. This shows that em-
ployment in manufacturing sectors has fallen sharply and continues to do so. Three 
and half million jobs7 have been lost in Europe’s manufacturing since 2008.
Figure 1.  PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IN EU MANUFACTURING 
 2000-2014
Source: European Commission (2014), «Helping Firms Grow, European Competitiveness Report 2014», European 
Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014)277 final, p. 19. Data: Eurostat.
Downwards trends even go beyond production and employment. The share of 
manufacturing in GDP has fallen from 15.8% before the crisis to 15.1% in 20138. 
While such trends reflect, to some extent, a structural shift to the service sector and 
the changing nature of manufacturing which is becoming increasingly knowledge-
intensive and therefore less conducive to job creation, they also reveal profound 
weaknesses in European manufacturing. Furthermore, its strategic competitive posi-
tion in the global economy is increasingly challenged by other economies, mainly 
the US and Asian countries.
7  European Commission (2014), «Progress in industrial competitiveness per EU country», Memo 
14/526, September.
8  European Commission (2013), «European competitiveness report 2013, Towards knowledge-driven 
reindustrialisation», European  Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2013)347 final.
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Figure 2.  EU, CHINESE AND US SHARES OF WORLD MANUFACTURING 
 PRODUCTION VALUE, 2004-2012
Source: European Commission (2014), «Helping Firms Grow, European Competitiveness Report 2014», European 
Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014)277 final, p. 22.  Data: EC calculation based on UN national 
accounts main aggregates database.
Such challenges are also well illustrated by the following figures. Figure 2 indi-
cates that the EU share of world manufacturing production value has steadily de-
clined since the start of the economic crisis, while it has been booming in China 
from 2006 onwards. A decline can also be observed in the US between 2006 and 
2009. But it has since stabilised and US manufacturing now seems to have entered 
onto a path of recovery. When looking at Figure 3 and the distribution of the world 
manufacturing added value, the situation seems to be far less dramatic for Europe. 
Europe is still generating around 28% of world manufacturing added value and is 
well above the US and China. This is an important aspect to take into consideration 
when assessing the position of EU manufacturing in the global economy. Yet, trends 
are often more telling than absolute figures. The EU’s share has been sharply de-
creasing since 2008, while the opposite trend is occurring in China. Looking at the 
ranking of individual countries in the global manufacturing gross value added (see 
Figure 4) confirms the evidence of a loss of European countries’ competitiveness. 
On the contrary, emerging economies such as Brazil, India and China, which have 
traditionally played a secondary role in the global value chain, have now begun to 
catch up and are getting top positions in the ranking. All this shows that these coun-
tries have now entered the world of complex and innovative value chains, which 
were previously considered the preserve of developed economies.
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Figure 3.  EU, CHINESE AND US SHARES OF WORLD MANUFACTURING 
 VALUE ADDED, 2004-2011
Source: European Commission (2014), «Helping Firms Grow, European Competitiveness Report 2014», European 
Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014)277 final, p. 22. Data: EC calculation based on UN national 
accounts main aggregates database.
Figure 4.  TOP MANUFACTURERS BY SHARE OF GLOBAL NOMINAL  
 MANUFACTURING GROSS VALUE ADDED 
Source: Manyika J., Sinclair J., Dobbs R. et al. (2012), «Manufacturing the future: the next era of global growth and 
Innovation», McKinsey Global Institute. Data: Based on HIS Global Insight database sample of 75 economies, of 
which 28 are developed and 47 are developing; manufacturing here is calculated top down from the HIS Global 
insight aggregate; there might be discrepancy with bottom-up calculations elsewhere. Note: (1) South Korea 
ranked 25 in 1980. (2) In 2000 Indonesia ranked 20 and Russia 21.
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The next section will show why a loss in manufacturing competitiveness is a 
matter of concern. It will also provide evidence on manufacturing’s positive exter-
nalities on the whole economy.
2.2. manufacturing matters!
Strong evidence has shown that manufacturing is essential and creates strategic 
links with other parts of the economy. In the 2013 Competitiveness report, the 
Commission indicates that an «additional final demand in manufacturing generates 
around half as much additional final demand elsewhere in the economy». In addition, 
manufacturing represents the major source of investment in research and develop-
ment (R&D) (62.3% in 2011)9, a key source of exports (80% of total EU exports)10 
and a main driver for employment in other sectors, including services. In this re-
spect, economists have demonstrated that each additional job in manufacturing cre-
ates between 0.5 to 2 jobs in other sectors. In other words, ceding capacities in man-
ufacturing can have very detrimental effects on the economy as a whole. Moreover, 
it might result in the loss of R&D, exports, design capabilities, and innovation in the 
longer term11. 
The increased linkage between manufacturing activities and manufacturing-re-
lated services also needs to be seriously taken into consideration. Manufacturing 
firms are no longer limited to production activities as such. They increasingly devel-
op pre- and after-sales services and provide customised solutions to customers. To-
day, the share of service-related jobs in manufacturing employment represents 
around 40%12. Experts are therefore talking about the ‘servitisation’ of manufactur-
ing as the service content in manufacturing final output has significantly increased 
over the last decades. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that it is not 
only the quality of the product that determines a firm’s market share, but also the 
quality of the service (or solutions) attached to it. 
In light of this, there is no doubt that production activities and services are com-
plementing each other, or even more so, are depending on each other. This is some-
thing that needs to be taken seriously into account when designing policies as the 
development of high quality support services can play a pivotal role in maintaining 
manufacturing production and employment in Europe. Indeed, many services are 
closely linked to manufacturing activities and located where the local demand is. In 
9  Eurostat data. This figure relates to the share of business enterprise sector’s expenditure in total EU 
R&D expenditure.
10  Eurostat data.
11  Warwick, K. (2013), «Beyond Industrial Policy – Emerging issues and trends», OECD Science, Tech-
nology and Industry Policy Papers, Paris.
12  Data based on the EU Labour Force Survey. See, Veugelers R. (2013), «Manufacturing Europe’s 
growth», Volume XIII, Bruegel blueprint series, Bruegel, Brussels, p. 28.
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other words, building new and innovative capabilities in services could reduce off-
shoring trends.
Notwithstanding the wide deindustrialisation process occurring across Europe, 
it is worth noting that the trend is uneven between Member States. There are indeed 
disconcerting divergences in the weight and performance of manufacturing across 
Europe. 
2.3. Increased divergences of manufacturing performance across the EU
The EU’s industrial base has always been characterised by significant differences 
in industries’ structure and their capacity to grow. Such differences are both per-
ceivable at the firm level, depending on their size and innovation capabilities, but 
also across the EU territory. Divergences between countries have even increased 
over the last years, not least due to the effect of the crisis. Figures 5 and 6 provide ev-
idence in this respect. While Figure 5 shows the wide discrepancies of national share 
in EU manufacturing by Member State, Figure 6 indicates that manufacturing re-
covery has been very uneven across the EU.
Figure 5.  SHARE IN EU MANUFACTURING BY MEMBER STATE
 (% of total)
Source: European Commission (2013), «Competing in Global Value Chains, EU Industrial Structure Report 2013», 
p.18. Data: Eurostat.
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Figure 6.  MANUFACTURING RECOVERY BY MEMBER STATE 2008-2014 
Source: European Commission (2014), «Helping Firms Grow, European Competitiveness Report 2014», European 
Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014)277 final, p.19. Data: Eurostat.
Different trends in Member States are explained by different factors as industrial 
policy is a cross-cutting area. Therefore, manufacturing performance relies on a wide 
range of competitiveness drivers. It is the interaction between those drivers, which de-
termines firms’ competitive position and focusing merely on one of them while ne-
glecting the others would be wasteful. Therefore, differences in national manufactur-
ing performance are explained by divergences in the major drivers of competitiveness. 
Understanding the factors behind a high level of productivity and competitiveness has 
been the subject of numerous studies. In this respect, the World Economic Forum has 
set up the Global Competitiveness Index, a comprehensive tool that measures the mi-
cro-economic and macro-economic determinants of national competitiveness13. 
These determinants are grouped into 12 pillars of competitiveness14. They sketch out 
the contours of good framework conditions in which European firms should operate 
and have a direct impact on input factors, i.e. the factors utilised in the production of 
goods. This section sheds light on some of them, in particular the level of labour pro-
13  For more information on the performance of EU countries in the Global Competitiveness Index, see 
the online ranking available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2014-15/GCR_Rank-
ings_2014-2015.pdf, last accessed on: 10 November 2014.
14  See, Sala-I-Martin X., Bilbao-Osorio B., Di Battista A., Drzeniek Hanouz M.,Galvan C., Geiger T. 
(2014), «The Global Competitiveness Index 2014-2015: Accelerating a robust recovery to create produc-
tive jobs and support inclusive growth», World Economic Forum, Geneva.
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ductivity, access to finance, and innovation performance, and points out to the pro-
found divide between Member States.
In Figure 7, one can see that the level of labour productivity varies considerably 
between Member States. While countries from Central and Northern Europe are the 
top performers, Southern and Eastern ones have a relative low level of labour pro-
ductivity.
Figure 7.  APPARENT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING  
 (BY NACE REV. 2) BY MEMBER STATE, 2011
 (thousand of euros per person employed)
Data: Eurostat (data not available for Malta). Note: Apparent labour productivity is defined as value added at factor 
costs divided by the number of persons employed. This ratio is generally presented in thousands of euros per person 
employed. 
Figure 8 gives an indication of SMEs’ access to debt and equity finance across 
the EU. Most of the countries which were more severely affected by the economic 
crisis, like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, figure among the worst performing 
countries. 
Figure 9 gives an idea of public R&D expenditure in each country and the per-
formance in Science and Technology excellence, showing that there is a strong cor-
relation between the two. However, this correlation does not hold true for all coun-
tries, indicating that the quality of spending also matters. This point is further 
illustrated by Figure 10, which shows that other factors also play a role in a country’s 
innovation performance.
Supporting EuropE’S nEw phaSE of rE-induStrialiSation
129
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
Figure 8.  SMAF INDEX, EU MEMBER STATES, 2012
 (Index value EU 2007=100)
Source: SMEs and access to finance Index, European Commission, DG Enterprise and industry. 
Note: The SMAF index provides an indication of the changing conditions of SMEs’ access to finance over time for the 
EU and its Member States. The index is calculated using a baseline of EU 2007=100, allowing comparison between 
countries and over time. The base reference of 2007 deliberately provides a baseline before the onset of the financial 
downturn. The index comprises two main elements or sub-indices: access to debt finance and access to equity finance. 
These sub-indices are calculated using data from the following sources: European Central Bank (ECB) for debt; 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and European Business Angel Network (EBAN) for equity; and the 
EC and ECB’s Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs (SAFE) for both sub-indices.
Figure 9.  INVESTMENT AND RESEARCH EXCELLENCE 
Source: European Commission (2012), «State of the Innovation Union Report 2012, Accelerating Change», p. 9. 
Data: Eurostat.
Note: (1) Average public R&D Intensity (public Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D as % of GDP). (2) EL 2004-
2007; SE-IT: 2005-2010; LU 2009-2010. (3) Composite indicator on Science & Technology (S&T) excellence 
(feasibility study of JRC).
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It is thus a set of factors which explains the long and persistent fragmentation of 
the European industrial landscape and which has contributed to the co-existence of 
different industrial models in Europe. 
Figure 10.  EU MEMBER STATES’ INNOVATION PERFORMANCE
Source: European Commission (2014), «Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014», p.5. 
Note: The vertical axis represents the average innovation performance and it is measured using a composite 
indicator building on data for 25 indicators going from a lowest possible performance of 0 to a maximum possible 
performance of 1. The performance of Innovation leaders is 20% or more above that of the EU27; of Innovation 
followers it is less than 20% above but more than 10% below that of the EU27; of Moderate innovators it is less 
than 10% below but more than 50% below that of the EU27; and for Modest innovators it is below 50% that of the 
EU27.
For more information see, Hollanders H, Tarantola S. (2011) «Innovation Union Scoreboard 2010 - Methodology 
report», January.
3. pOLICY OptIOnS FOr A nEw phASE OF rE-InDUStrIALISAtIOn In 
EUrOpE 
The previous chapter has both highlighted the key role that the manufacturing 
sector plays in our economy as well as the difficulties that Europe’s industry is facing 
to maintain its competitive advantage. Against this background, it becomes crucial 
for the EU and its Member States to develop a strategic vision on where Europe’s in-
dustry should position itself and to reflect on what choices need to be made to im-
plement such a vision. Certainly, Europe cannot compete on price with emerging 
economies. Another route, based on research, innovation, skills and high ecological 
standards, has to be taken. This chapter presents three courses of action occurring at 
different levels of governance and that should be at the core of a new phase of re-in-
dustrialisation in Europe. Going from the firm level to the European level, these ac-
tions consist in: (1) taking the lead in new business models, (2) promoting industri-
al eco-systems through systemic innovation, and (3) supporting the emergence of a 
genuine European value chain.
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3.1. becoming a leader in new business models
Our economic and industrial model is based on a «take, make and dispose» ap-
proach. Together with a growing and evermore consuming middle class in the world, 
this puts an enormous strain on global resources, including energy sources, water, land, 
food and minerals, and at the same time on the environment. It is becoming clear that 
this linear approach is no longer sustainable. Over-exploitation of resources and envi-
ronmental destruction are leading to resource scarcity, which can have far-reaching and 
unforeseeable economic, social, environmental and security implications. 
European industry is extremely vulnerable in the face of this global resource 
challenge. European companies outsource the largest share of resource extraction in 
the world. In 2013, raw materials, including energy imports, were worth ―704 bil-
lion15. The EU is dependent on energy imports such as oil and gas from just a few 
suppliers – including Russia. It relies on outside sources of raw materials for chemi-
cal, construction and other industrial sectors. For example, it needs rare earths from 
China to feed its high-tech and environmental industries. As global competition for 
resources continues to increase, resource supplies become less secure. It is in the 
EU’s and European industry’s interest to reduce this vulnerability16. Companies 
which improve their resource productivity will be more competitive in resource-
scarce markets and less affected by resource and environment-related challenges, sup-
ply disruptions and volatile prices.
It is a great contradiction that while Europeans acknowledge their resource-depend-
ency, waste keeps on accumulating at the same time, not enough materials are recycled 
and valuable materials are continually lost or shipped outside the EU. Every year, the EU 
produces around three billion tonnes of waste, of which manufacturing activities gener-
ate 360 million tonnes and construction activities bring about 900 million tonnes17. As 
only 40% of solid waste is recycled, this accounts for a significant loss of resources for a 
resource-dependent Europe. In addition, recycling manufactured products could have 
significant benefits for European industries. For instance, 6,000 used mobile phones 
contain about 3.5 kilograms of silver, 340 grams of gold and 130 kilograms of copper18. 
The benefits of implementing new business models and moving towards a circular 
economy, i.e. a model based on the recycling and re-use of materials, would be tremen-
15  See the website of DG Trade, European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/access-
ing-markets/goods-andservices/raw-materials/, last accessed on: 4 November 2014.
16  For more information see: Ahtonen A., Chiorean-Sime S. (2012), «Green revolution: making eco-ef-
ficiency a driver for growth», EPC Issue Paper no. 68, Brussels.
17  European Commission brochure (2010): «Being wise with waste: the EU’s approach to waste man-
agement».
18  Science Daily (2009), «Set World Standards For Electronics Recycling, Reuse To Curb E-waste Ex-
ports To Developing Countries, Experts Urge», 17 September, available at: http://www.sciencedaily.
com/releases/2009/09/090915140919.htm, last accessed on 31 October 2014. 
Claire Dhéret
132
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
dous both for the planet as well as for European industries. A McKinsey study suggests 
that, if done on a global level, the transition towards a circular economy would lead to 
global material savings of more than $1 trillion a year by 202519. With respect to the bene-
fits on the European economy, the Commission Communication «Towards a circular 
economy: A zero waste programme for Europe» estimates that increasing resource effi-
ciency could help to reduce material input needs along the value chains by 17%-24% by 
2030, and that more efficient use of resources could help European industry to save annu-
ally €630 billion20.  On a national level, it has been estimated that British businesses 
would gain around €28 billion annually by taking no-cost or low cost measures to im-
prove the way they use energy and water, and by reducing waste. Indeed, a better use of 
resources would help European industries to cut costs and thus improve competitiveness.
Some companies, such as French car company Renault, have already taken steps 
to change their business models, to reuse more products or components and restore 
important material, energy and labour inputs – while enjoying the benefits. For in-
stance, producing remanufactured parts compared to new parts has enabled Renault 
to use 80% less energy, 88% less water, 92% less chemical products, and generate 
70% less waste. In the model implemented by Renault, waste has become a resource 
for the supply chain. Materials are used to their fullest potential and manufacturing 
pieces are reused as much as possible while closing the loop of product lifecycles. 
Such a model requires a strong collaboration with all stakeholders involved in 
the innovation and production chain. Contrary to the linear economy, which is 
built on complex and geographically dispersed value chains, the circular economy 
relies on network activities in which products are turned into components and ma-
terials. Manufacturers that adopt new business models, redesign their products and 
practices have to work closely with suppliers and waste professionals. By doing so, 
manufacturers can maximise the number of consecutive product cycles, bring their 
costs down and increase their competitiveness. Waste professionals will no longer 
have a product at the end of its life cycle at their disposal but a resource fit to be re-
incorporated into production. In other words, all pre- and post-production activi-
ties need to be put into a coherent and coordinated system. For instance, strict eco-
design requirements are necessary to optimise the remanufacturing and the reuse of 
components and such requirements have to be implemented by all stakeholders and 
suppliers. In the case of Renault, the company is working closely with INDRA, 
which is specialised in the dismantling of end-of-life vehicles in France and coordi-
nates a network of 400 SMEs distributed throughout the French territory in order to 
collect local end-of-life vehicles. The company develops processes and permanent 
tools for optimising the dismantling of vehicles, the sorting and collection process of 
19  Nguyen H., Stuchtey M., Zils M. (2014), «Remaking the industrial economy», McKinsey Quarterly, 
February.
20  European Commission  (2014), «Towards a circular economy: A zero waste programme for Eu-
rope», COM (2014)398.
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materials and the distribution of reused spare parts, which are all made possible 
thanks to an appropriate eco-design. 
In addition to increasing resource efficiency, circular economy models are also 
changing the role of consumers, which are no longer considered as buyers but rather 
as users of a specific product. In the case of Renault, end-users are put at the heart of 
Renault’s business models and new types of offers are made to Renault’s clients. For 
instance, clients have the possibility to lease batteries, or to use remanufactured me-
chanical parts. Thus, after-sales services have been developed for offering reused 
spare parts in order to prolong the life of old vehicles. Besides the positive ecological 
impact, this is also having positive effects for the end-users, as it reduces the price of 
the vehicle while continuing to ensure high quality products. 
Another interesting example is provided by a division of Royal Philips. Philips 
Healthcare has shifted its activities from selling products to selling services: it leases 
equipment to its customers and after the service contract with initial users of equip-
ment has been completed, it upgrades and refurbishes the product, before leasing it 
to other customers. The Dutch company estimates this part of their activity to be 
worth €200 million21. Also the Lighting divison has started to sell lighting as a ser-
vice. As a result customers can have latest technology lighting with high energy effi-
ciency, without paying the upfront costs. At the same time Philips is in a better posi-
tion to collect and recycle the lamps, and reduce its use of new materials. 
These examples illustrate perfectly the growing interconnectedness between a man-
ufactured product and the services that are developed around it and highlight a key po-
tential for the future of the manufacturing sector in Europe. It would indeed open up 
new markets and support local employment as creating services capabilities attached to a 
specific product would create non-relocatable jobs, increase the need for having some of 
the production stages close to where services are delivered and reduce the need for off-
shoring. In addition, such a model responds to some growing expectations among Euro-
pean consumers, i.e. to use products with high level ecological standards. 
On the side of the industry, it makes sense for European companies to make their 
business models more sustainable and reap the benefits of it. At the same time, it is 
worth to acknowledge that the benefits would be even greater if the system as a whole 
supported more sustainable production and consumption patterns. This would re-
quire further collaboration between business and research centers, policy makers and 
investors. Transition to a circular economy, where resources and materials would be 
restored and reused across value chains would require changes not only to business 
and market models, but also to product design, how waste is turned into a resource, 
and to consumer behaviour. For example, while companies can themselves aim to 
maximize the reusability of products and components when designing them, the ben-
21  Fleming T., Zils M. (2014), «Toward a circular economy: Philips CEO Frans van Houten», McKinsey 
Quarterly, February.
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efits would be greater if an industrial system would be in place where products are de-
signed and optimised for disassembly and reuse, and if the components and resources 
were used over and over again in the system – to the extent that this is possible.
To encourage industry to adopt new business models that would support a transi-
tion towards a circular economy, requires -first of all- a better understanding of the 
positive impacts and needed measures. It is easy to stay locked into linear models or 
fear that the costs of the transition outweigh the benefits, if there is no evidence to 
prove otherwise. More research is needed to demonstrate the positive impact of this 
transition on companies’ competitiveness and to identify what kind of business mod-
els and investment decisions are the most successful. This requires identifying sectors 
and materials that would benefit the most from a circular approach and lead to great-
est economic and environmental gains. In its 2014 report, the Ellen MacArthur Foun-
dation shows that in the manufacturing sector, the materials-intensive automotive, 
machinery, and equipment industries would enjoy the highest long term gains22. For 
its part, the European Commission commissioned a scoping study to identify poten-
tial circular economy actions, priority sectors, material flows and value chains23. The 
study identified agricultural products and waste, wood and paper, plastics, metals and 
phosphorus as priority materials and packaging, food, electronic and electrical equip-
ment, transport, furniture, buildings and construction as priority sectors. 
Investment and access to finance are also important challenges. Companies must 
have the resources to change their business models and invest in product design and in-
novative processes. Policy makers must provide a framework fit to stimulate private in-
vestments. Encouraging investments in resource efficiency by shifting taxes from labour 
towards pollution and resources as well as phasing out environmentally harmful subsi-
dies are some good examples of how policies can influence industrial activities. In the 
same vein, public procurement has a central role to play to steer innovation into the 
right direction. Promoting green public procurement and businesses that implement a 
circular economy model can help companies to reduce the initial costs that such a tran-
sition implies. Lastly, using public funds to develop waste treatment infrastructure is a 
necessity as companies, in particular SMEs, cannot always cost-effectively repair or reuse 
their products24 and do not have the resources to adopt a new business model.
An additional question to address, also in the light of the complexity of global 
value chains, is: at which geographical scale should one attempt to set up circular 
loops? An industrial symbiosis model, where companies can sell their by-products 
22  World Economic Forum, in collaboration Ellen MacArthur Foundation and McKinsey & Company 
(2014), «Towards the circular economy - Accelerating the scale-up across global supply chains», 2014 
Report, January, Geneva.
23  European Commission (2014), «Scoping study to identify potential circular economy actions, priori-
ty sectors, material flows and value chains», Final report, August.
24  European Commission Communication (2014), «Towards a circular economy: A zero waste pro-
gramme for Europe», COM (2014)398.
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and waste to each other, works better if they are geographically close. This physical 
proximity would also help to bring down costs as it would encourage using com-
mon infrastructures and treating different waste types more efficiently. Also leasing 
and pay-per-use formulas as if the goods to consume were services rather than 
products, would benefit from physical proximity. Having manufacturers operate 
close to where the products are used, would also allow companies to strengthen ties 
with customers. However, as the circular economy follows the rules of supply and 
demand, the loop can also work on a larger scale. As China is a major exporter of 
consumer products, there is natural demand for recyclates that can be turned into 
finished goods, and then sold back to Europe. More information is needed to un-
derstand the benefits of different scales for operations and to determine if there are 
any re-shoring opportunities25 for Europe, for example, in the recycling sector.
Using Europe’s dependence on foreign resources as a springboard to improve its 
own competence in re-using and refining resources, eco-design and waste treatment 
solutions could make the EU a global expert and world leader. This could have the 
additional benefit of helping the EU, in close cooperation with its trade partners, to 
become a standard-setter for the global market. 
3.2.  promoting industrial eco-systems through systemic innovation
In line with a change in industrial policy thinking in the early 2000s, greater at-
tention has been put on systemic innovation abandoning the traditional interven-
tionist rationale of the 1960s and 1970s as well as the more horizontal26 approach 
prevailing in the 1980s and 1990s. The new systemic approach aims to ensure that 
the system does not contain any obstacles to firms’ growth and industrial develop-
ment. As part of this new rationale, systemic innovation with meso-level networks 
of businesses and relevant organisations and complete industrial eco-systems play a 
key role. The attention is therefore no longer focused on technological innovation 
or the performance of a single firm and /or product but rather on how a transfor-
mation of the system can lead to more innovation. 
Some European regions have already succeeded to develop strong meso-level net-
works, which have helped them become leaders in high value added and knowledge-rich 
products. Two important choices lie at the heart of their economic success and have ena-
bled them to build up a complete industrial eco-system: specialisation and clustering.
These regions generally specialise in the production of complex durable goods 
(such as cars, aircrafts or production machinery) thanks to industries with comple-
25  Reshoring is the practice of bringing outsourced personnel and services back to the location from 
which they were originally offshored; for more information see: EPRS (2014), «Reshoring of EU manu-
facturing», Briefing, 21 March.
26  Many scholars also describe this period as the one dominated by laissez-faire policies. For more de-
tails on the evolution of the industrial policy thinking, see Dhéret C., Morosi M. with Frontini A., Hed-
berg A., and Pardo R. (2014), «Towards a New Industrial Policy for Europe», EPC Issue Paper n° 78. 
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mentary capabilities that are located near each other to create a complete industrial 
ecosystem. Specialisation therefore takes place within a complex web of relation-
ships in which production tools, parts and components are exchanged between 
hundreds of suppliers, sub-contractors and original equipment manufacturers to be 
integrated with the help of highly skilled workers and sophisticated production sys-
tems. This is valid especially for industries in which a dialogue between actors in the 
value chain is important for quality production and innovation. 
The economic theory on industrial agglomeration suggests that firms tend to cluster 
near each other in order to reduce transport costs, namely the costs of moving goods, 
people and ideas. Geographical concentration helps manufacturing to reduce shipment 
costs between suppliers and customers. Moreover, firms benefit from the flow of skilled 
workers and ideas (the so-called knowledge spill-overs) across firms and industries. 
Yet, globalisation and the rise of emerging economies have come to undermine 
the key components of industrial eco-systems in some European regions. Attracted 
by public investment, an innovation-friendly environment and booming market de-
mand, some major European industries have relocated parts of their production 
process to emerging economies, in particular Asia, over the last decades. These 
economies have invested substantial resources to build strong innovation hubs to 
attract foreign investment27, which could ultimately contribute to the development 
of their local industry. As a result, European original equipment manufacturers, 
who shifted their production outside Europe, were sometimes followed by their 
large suppliers. This has created large holes in the European industrial eco-system. 
Moreover, equipment manufacturers fear that better opportunities to exploit scale 
effects in emerging markets could induce key European component suppliers to dis-
mantle capacities in the EU, endangering strategic upstream linkages28.
In order to tackle these new challenges and to repair the holes in its industrial 
eco-systems, Europe has to ensure that industries can benefit from key advantages 
while locating their activities in Europe. In this vein, clusters remain one of the ade-
quate responses. Research has shown that clusters’ success requires a balanced inter-
action of four determinants: demand conditions (i.e. market demand), input (or 
factor) conditions, presence of supporting industries and company rivalry (or 
competition)29. Among the input conditions is the co-location of technology and re-
search centres. Such centres can play a catalytic role in boosting the innovation and 
27  Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (2012), «Innovation - How the emerging markets are driving the 
global innovation agenda», Global Topic Initiative, Munich.
28  Vieweg H. G. (2012), «An introduction to mechanical engineering: Study on the competitiveness of 
the EU mechanical engineering industry», Within the framework contract of sectoral competitiveness 
studies-ENTR/06/054, Final report, Munich.
29  Zadeh R. M. (2007), «Cluster Development and Initiatives in Traditional Industries», Paper for Interna-
tional Cluster Conference: Patterns of Clusters Evolution, Yorkshire Forward, Brussels; see also Porter M. 
(1990), «The competitive advantage of nations», Harvard Business Review, Cambridge, U.S., March/April.
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economic development potential of a cluster as they might stimulate collaborative 
relations between industry and universities, and thus help bridge research, i.e. the 
generation of knowledge, with the market. At a time when the fourth industrial rev-
olution is emerging, it is essential to ensure that Europe’s industry integrates disrup-
tive technologies such as additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and automa-
tion. In order to integrate these technologies into products in a timely manner and 
to accelerate their commercialisation process, manufacturing companies need to 
work together with research and technology institutes. In addition, the costs of in-
novation have to be affordable. By enabling all agents of the innovation chain30 to 
pull their resources and skills together and connecting them to a vast pool of know-
how and capabilities, clusters allow for a reduction of the innovation costs.  
Finally, the systemic approach based on strong and specialised industrial eco-sys-
tems is particularly relevant to the need (as highlighted in the previous section) for Eu-
rope to become a leader in new business models. It should even be considered as one of 
the pre-conditions for their development. Indeed, the new business models that can ad-
dress ongoing trends indicated earlier in this paper, such as the growing demand for tai-
lor-made products with high-ecological standards, the increased attention devoted to 
societal challenges such as climate change, require the presence of strong industrial eco-
systems where the relevant agents are located near each other.
3.3. Facilitating the Europeanisation of the value chain
The international fragmentation of production in global value chains (GVCs) is 
the major element shaping the new environment in which European industry oper-
ates today. As defined by the OECD, a value chain is «the full range of activities that 
firms engage in to bring a product to the market, from conception to final use. Such ac-
tivities range from design, production, marketing, logistics and distribution to support 
to the final customer”31. Every activity embodied in the production of a good gener-
ates a certain value added and the position of a country in the GVCs it participates 
in determines to what extent it benefits from it. The structure of the value chain and 
the value of each production stage may vary from one product to another but gener-
ally speaking, upstream activities such as R&D and design as well as downstream ac-
tivities such as branding and marketing create more value added than assembly. 
Nowadays, a product is no longer created by a single firm in one location. Progress 
in information and communication technologies, the increased digitalisation of our 
economies, trade liberalisation, and cheaper transport costs have enabled companies to 
slice up production into separable stages and to look for the best suited location for each 
30  The innovation chain entails different steps, including technological research, product development 
and demonstration activities. 
31  OECD (2013), «Interconnected economies: Benefiting from global value chains – Synthesis report», 
OECD Publications, Paris, p.8.
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of them. Thus, many European manufacturing firms have broken up their value chain 
and outsourced parts of it to external companies located either inside or outside Europe. 
As a result, the production of a good involves a growing number of intermediate firms 
and value chains have internationalised and become increasingly complex. 
The growing fragmentation of manufacturing activities has raised significant 
opportunities for European firms, contrary to what is usually assumed. Firm level 
analysis has shown that firms, which are integrated in GVCs -either through off-
shoring or outsourcing32 activities, importing components or exporting their goods- 
have better productivity performance, and are more open to complex innovation 
strategies involving both production processes and components. Those firms, al-
though few in number, are also driving the creation of a country’s total value added, 
trade flows and employment33. In addition, the fragmentation of production led to 
an industrial restructuring both across the European economies and between Eu-
rope and the rest of the world, which enabled European firms to specialise in the 
higher value added segments of the value chain34. 
Figure 11.  SHARE OF FOREIGN VALUE ADDED (IN EXPORTS) BY ORIGIN 
 2011                                      (percentages)
Source: Amador J., Cappariello R., Stehrer R. (2013), «Global value chains: A view from the euro area», Paper 
presented at the CompNet Conference, 16-17 April, Washington DC.
32  While offshoring refers to the activities performed by foreign manufacturing affiliates, outsourcing 
means contracting with other manufacturing firms abroad.
33  See Veugelers R. (ed.) (2013), op. cit.
34  Ibid.
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Manufacturing products are, therefore, increasingly ‘made in the world’ and 
parts and components cross borders many times before the final product arrives on 
the market. Against this background, the national discourse recently adopted by na-
tional policy makers promoting ‘Made in…[national country]’ might sound anach-
ronistic. This seems to ignore the functioning and the benefits of GVCs as well as 
the fact that globalisation and the international fragmentation of the value chain are 
not expected to stop. That being said, it is worth thinking about how the EU could 
better support Member States’ efforts to climb up the value chain and reflecting 
upon the benefits of the Europeanisation of the value chain, i.e. the possibility for 
firms to organise their value chains across EU countries. In this respect, the question 
of how the Europeanisation of the value chain could contribute to maintaining a 
healthy share of manufacturing in Europe and to having a strong industrial base 
spread over the whole territory needs to feature high on the policy agenda. 
Developing such an approach requires taking two empirical elements into con-
sideration. First, the participation of European firms in GVCs is mainly EU driven35. 
Looking at the euro area, one can see that the foreign value added in exports is 
–while increasing as share of exports– largely sourced from other euro area countries 
(see Figure 11). Looking at the EU as a whole, one can also observe that some coun-
tries, like Germany, have strongly integrated their economies with Eastern European 
countries36. Second, this EU orientation does not disadvantage European firms. Euro-
pean value chains seem to generate as much benefits as GVCs do. Indeed, the evidence 
suggests neither a productivity premium nor a discount for European firms that con-
centrate their international value chain in Europe37. In addition, the Europeanisation 
of value chains can generate additional benefits, such as avoiding high coordination 
and transportation costs compared to GVCs. Against this background, looking at ways 
to further integrate European value chains has real significance. It would create im-
portant benefits for the European economy as a whole and help to have an industrial 
base evenly distributed across the whole territory. 
Enabling the emergence of the Europeanisation of value chains should, howev-
er, not be equal to protectionism. In this respect, it should be kept in mind that 
trade has positive effects on Europe’s industry. This is indeed EU’s most important 
source of growth as manufacturing achieves a trade surplus of ―300 billion. Instead 
of protectionism, European value chains should be based on excellence, strong dif-
ferentiation factors relative to goods produced elsewhere and on the advantages of 
being part of a fully integrated Single Market. That being said, Europe should not be 
naive either. As already mentioned earlier in this paper, many industrial nations 
35  Variations among countries do, however, exist. The size of a country’s economy is the determining 
factor, as smaller countries generally display higher share of foreign value added than bigger countries.
36  Di Mauro F. Hedwig P., Stehrer R. (2013), op. cit. 
37  Veugelers R. (ed.) (2013), op. cit.
Claire Dhéret
140
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
have launched ambitious strategies and put in place protective measures to defend 
their industries. While respecting trade agreements, the EU should also make sure 
its firms face the same conditions as foreign companies and are not put at a disad-
vantage in international competition.
In addition, moving towards further integrated value chains at EU level does 
neither contradict with an external strategy for manufacturing nor with off-shoring 
and outsourcing certain activities. Production stages should still stay where they can 
be performed most efficiently. It is rather in the high value added segments of the 
production chain where efforts need to be deployed and where Europe needs to look 
at how to make industries work better together. Limiting the foreign value added 
embodied in EU exports and consumption goods to activities in which Europe’s in-
dustry cannot offer a comparative advantage, be it due to labour costs, lack of natu-
ral resources or other production factors, should therefore be the ultimate objective.
4. COnCLUSIOn
This paper has both shown the pivotal role that manufacturing activities play in 
our economy and the difficulty that Europe faces to maintain a strong industrial 
base. Europe’s manufacturing activities have been in decline for several decades now 
and the downward trend will continue if no strategic choices are made. These choic-
es have to take current global challenges into account, including the increased com-
petition from emerging economies as well as the new waves of disruptive technolo-
gies, as highlighted at the last 2016 World Economic Forum in Davos38, that will 
alter the nature of manufacturing activities. 
In order to cope with such challenges and to fully embrace the fourth industrial 
revolution, Europe will need to create new capabilities and use the full potential of 
having specialised and diverse economies across its territory. Against this background, 
this paper proposes three strategic choices: (1) the promotion of new business models; 
(2) the creation of industrial eco-systems through systemic innovation; and (3) the 
support for a genuine European value chain, which together could stimulate a new 
phase of re-industrialisation in Europe. These choices are complementary and the 
large benefits that they could generate on a European scale depend on how well each 
of them is implemented. These choices imply important changes at different levels of 
governance and will require a strong support from public authorities at each level and 
also a great degree of cooperation among them. Moreover, public authorities, be it at 
the national or European level, will have to rethink their role in supporting European 
industries’ competitiveness. This will require certain important paradigm shifts both 
in the way public authorities make use of some policy instruments, such as public pro-
curement, and how industry is organised across the European territory. 
38  For more information on this point, see the website of the World Economic Forum: http://www.we-
forum.org/, last accessed on: 11/02/2016.
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